(By Quratulain Khalid)

As the expanded BRICS gathers in India amid great-power rivalry, wars, economic fragmentation and the rise of the Global South, the real question is whether the grouping can transform its growing economic weight into genuine geopolitical power—and where Pakistan should position itself in the emerging multipolar order.

Introduction

The leaders of the BRICS countries are gathering in New Delhi at a moment when the international system is undergoing one of its most consequential transformations since the end of the Cold War. The 18th BRICS Summit is being held on 12–13 September 2026 under India’s chairmanship, with the theme “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.” India says more than 350 meetings and high-level engagements have been conducted during its year-long chairmanship, covering political and security, economic and financial, and cultural and people-to-people cooperation.

But beneath the carefully crafted diplomatic language lies a much larger question:

Is BRICS merely demanding a greater voice within the existing international system, or is it gradually helping to construct an alternative to it?

And for Pakistan, there is an equally important question:

Should Islamabad seek a place inside this expanding grouping, even if doing so complicates its relationships with India, the United States and other traditional partners?

My answer is straightforward: Pakistan should continue pursuing BRICS membership and should join if admitted—but it must do so as an exercise in strategic diversification, not as an anti-American or anti-Western alignment.

From BRIC to BRICS: The Evolution of an Idea

BRICS did not begin as a geopolitical alliance.

The acronym BRIC was originally coined to describe four large emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India and China. The concept initially reflected an economic observation—that these countries were becoming increasingly important to global growth and would eventually demand greater influence in international economic institutions.

South Africa subsequently joined, transforming BRIC into BRICS.

Over time, however, the organisation evolved from an economic conversation into a political and diplomatic platform.

The expansion has been particularly significant. The current BRICS membership includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia.

This transformation has fundamentally altered the character of the organisation.

BRICS is no longer simply a grouping of five emerging economies discussing trade and development. It now encompasses major energy producers, industrial powers, populous developing countries, nuclear powers and states with very different political systems and foreign-policy objectives.

That gives BRICS enormous potential.

It also creates its greatest weakness.

The larger BRICS becomes, the greater its economic weight becomes—but the more difficult strategic consensus becomes.

The Weight of BRICS

The attraction of BRICS is obvious.

Its members collectively possess enormous:

• populations;
• energy resources;
• industrial capacity;
• agricultural production;
• mineral wealth;
• consumer markets;
• geographical reach;
• economic potential.

The expanded grouping represents roughly half of the world’s population, around 40 per cent of the global economy and about 26 per cent of global trade, according to figures cited in recent analysis of the bloc.

Those figures should not be dismissed.

But neither should they be exaggerated.

A large population does not automatically produce political power. A large GDP does not automatically produce strategic cohesion. And possessing oil, gas, minerals and industrial capacity does not mean that eleven countries will necessarily agree on how those assets should be used.

This is the fundamental distinction between power and collective power.

BRICS possesses enormous aggregate power.

Whether it can convert that power into coherent geopolitical influence remains an open question.

BRICS’ Ambition: Reform the System or Replace It?

The organisation’s ambitions have expanded well beyond trade.

BRICS increasingly advocates:

• greater representation for developing countries;
• reform of the United Nations;
• reform of international financial institutions;
• increased use of national currencies;
• alternative payment mechanisms;
• development financing;
• infrastructure investment;
• energy cooperation;
• technological cooperation;
• food and supply-chain security.

The New Development Bank is particularly significant because it represents an attempt to create an institution rather than simply criticise existing Western-led institutions.

Yet there is an important distinction.

BRICS does not necessarily want to abolish the existing international system.

India, in particular, has emphasised a more developmental and cooperative interpretation of BRICS rather than turning it into an explicitly anti-Western alliance. At the New Delhi summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi presented BRICS as a platform for cooperation among emerging economies rather than simply an organisation opposed to the West.

That position is important because India is simultaneously strengthening its relationship with the United States.

The message from New Delhi is therefore essentially:

Reform the international order—but do not necessarily destroy it.

India: The Host with a Delicate Balancing Act

India is perhaps the most interesting country at this summit.

New Delhi wants to be simultaneously:

• a leading voice of the Global South;
• a close strategic partner of the United States;
• an important partner of Russia;
• a competitor and trading partner of China;
• a major Indo-Pacific power;
• an important economic partner of the Gulf;
• and an independent pole of global power.

This is what India calls strategic autonomy.

India does not want to choose exclusively between Washington, Moscow and Beijing.

It wants all three to recognise India’s importance.

That is sophisticated statecraft.

India’s BRICS policy therefore contains a built-in contradiction: it wants BRICS to become stronger, but it does not want BRICS to become a Chinese-dominated or explicitly anti-American bloc.

This explains much of New Delhi’s approach to the organisation.

Modi and Xi: The Meeting Within the Summit

If there is one bilateral relationship deserving particular attention, it is India-China.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has arrived in New Delhi for the summit and is holding talks with Narendra Modi. It is Xi’s first visit to India in seven years.

This matters enormously.

India and China are:

• the world’s two most populous countries;
• major economic powers;
• nuclear-armed states;
• military competitors;
• major trading partners;
• members of the same BRICS organisation.

The relationship deteriorated dramatically following the 2020 Galwan Valley confrontation, in which 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers were killed. Since then, however, the two sides have gradually moved towards a cautious thaw, including troop disengagement and renewed economic and diplomatic contacts.

But the underlying strategic rivalry has not disappeared.

This creates a fascinating question:

Can BRICS become a major geopolitical force when its two largest Asian members remain strategic competitors?

The answer may determine the future character of BRICS more than any summit declaration.

Russia: BRICS as a Pillar of Multipolarity

For Russia, BRICS has acquired extraordinary strategic importance.

Moscow sees the organisation as a means of strengthening a world in which power is distributed among several major centres rather than concentrated around Washington and its allies.

BRICS provides Russia with:

• diplomatic space;
• alternative markets;
• economic relationships outside the West;
• financial alternatives;
• political legitimacy;
• stronger relations with China, India and the Global South.

But Russia’s objectives should not be confused with BRICS’ collective objectives.

Brazil does not necessarily think like Russia.

India does not think like Russia.

Saudi Arabia does not think like Russia.

The UAE does not think like Russia.

That is why describing BRICS simply as a “Russian-Chinese bloc” is analytically lazy.

BRICS is more complicated than that.

Iran and the Middle East: The Test of BRICS Unity

The current Middle Eastern crisis provides an even more difficult test.

Iran is a BRICS member.

But Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also part of the grouping, while Egypt has its own regional interests.

These states do not have identical strategic calculations regarding Iran, Israel, the United States or regional security.

Consequently, BRICS faces a fundamental test:

Can an organisation whose members have competing strategic interests speak with one voice on major international crises?

This year’s summit is taking place amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran and the continuing Russia-Ukraine war, circumstances that have placed extraordinary pressure on the bloc’s ability to maintain a common position.

The fact that BRICS members reportedly reached agreement on a joint declaration only after difficult negotiations is itself revealing.

A successful organisation is not one where every member agrees on everything.

But a genuinely strategic bloc needs sufficient common ground to act collectively.

The Dollar Question

Perhaps no issue has generated more speculation around BRICS than de-dollarisation.

There is a legitimate strategic objective behind it.

BRICS members want to increase:

• trade in national currencies;
• bilateral financial settlement;
• alternative payment mechanisms;
• financial cooperation;
• use of institutions such as the New Development Bank.

For countries facing sanctions or concerned about their dependence on Western-controlled financial infrastructure, this is understandable.

But there is an enormous difference between reducing dependence on the dollar and replacing the dollar.

The latter would require:

• enormous financial-market depth;
• monetary stability;
• convertibility;
• investor confidence;
• a common monetary framework;
• political trust;
• institutional integration.

BRICS does not possess these conditions.

The idea of an imminent BRICS common currency therefore remains far more political slogan than practical financial project.

The realistic development is more modest:

A gradual diversification of international payments rather than the sudden death of the dollar.

That distinction is important.

Can BRICS Replace the West?

This is where much of the popular commentary becomes exaggerated.

BRICS has genuine structural advantages.

But it lacks many of the characteristics that make the Western alliance system powerful.

It has no:

• collective defence clause;
• integrated military command;
• common foreign policy;
• common currency;
• common central bank;
• unified strategic doctrine.

Its members also have competing interests.

China and India compete.

India and Pakistan are rivals.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have different regional calculations.

India maintains a major strategic relationship with Washington.

Russia is confronting the West.

China is simultaneously economically intertwined with Western economies while strategically competing with them.

Therefore, BRICS is not NATO.

Nor is it likely to become one.

The more realistic conclusion is that BRICS will contribute to a world in which Western power remains enormous but is increasingly constrained by other centres of power.

That is not the end of the Western order.

It is the end of its uncontested character.

The United States: The Invisible Power at the Summit

Washington does not sit at the BRICS table, yet American power is present in almost every BRICS discussion.

Why?

Because the United States remains central to:

• global finance;
• the dollar system;
• international security;
• advanced technology;
• sanctions architecture;
• global alliances.

Consequently, BRICS can neither ignore America nor easily replace it.

The critical question is therefore not:

“Will BRICS defeat America?”

It is:

“Can BRICS become sufficiently powerful to force the United States and its allies to share influence with other major powers?”

That is a much more realistic proposition.

Trump and BRICS: A Warning for Pakistan

For Pakistan, the American reaction deserves particular attention.

Pakistan should not assume that Washington would automatically oppose Pakistani BRICS membership.

The reaction would depend largely upon how Islamabad uses membership.

There is a fundamental difference between saying:

“Pakistan is joining BRICS to expand economic and diplomatic cooperation.”

and saying:

“Pakistan is joining BRICS to oppose America and the Western system.”

The first is normal diplomacy.

The second is confrontation.

Pakistan cannot afford unnecessary confrontation with Washington.

The United States remains important to Pakistan in trade, investment, diplomacy, technology and other areas.

Therefore, if Pakistan eventually joins BRICS, Islamabad should make its position absolutely clear:

BRICS membership is not directed against the United States.

Pakistan should not exchange one dependency for another.

Strategic autonomy does not mean replacing Washington with Beijing.

It means ensuring that no single external power possesses enough leverage to dictate Pakistan’s choices.

Saudi Arabia: An Important Test for Pakistan

Pakistan’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is too important to be subordinated to any new geopolitical alignment.

Saudi Arabia’s participation in the BRICS framework itself demonstrates why simplistic descriptions of BRICS as an anti-Western organisation are inadequate.

Riyadh maintains close security and economic relations with Washington while simultaneously engaging with China, Russia and other emerging powers.

Pakistan should learn from this.

If Islamabad eventually joins BRICS, it should explain to Riyadh that the purpose is:

• economic diversification;
• investment;
• energy cooperation;
• trade;
• development financing;
• engagement with emerging markets.

There is no reason why BRICS membership should undermine Pakistan-Saudi relations.

Indeed, it could create additional opportunities in energy, investment, food security, logistics and infrastructure.

Türkiye: A Model of Strategic Flexibility

Türkiye provides another useful lesson.

Ankara is a NATO member but simultaneously maintains relationships with Russia, China, the Gulf states and the wider developing world.

The Turkish experience demonstrates that modern diplomacy does not necessarily require a country to live inside a single geopolitical box.

For Pakistan, the lesson is straightforward:

A country can maintain strategic relationships with competing powers if it possesses sufficient diplomatic skill and economic relevance.

Pakistan should seek precisely this kind of strategic flexibility.

Pakistan and BRICS: Should Islamabad Join?

Now we come to the most important question for Pakistan.

Pakistan formally applied for BRICS membership in 2023. Yet as the 2026 summit takes place, Pakistan remains outside the organisation. Recent reporting continues to identify India’s opposition as the principal obstacle, because expansion requires consensus among members.

This creates an unusual diplomatic situation.

Pakistan wants to join an organisation in which its principal regional rival has considerable influence over the admission process.

That does not mean Pakistan should abandon its application.

Quite the opposite.

Pakistan should continue pursuing BRICS membership.

And if admission becomes possible:

Pakistan should join.

But there must be a clear strategy behind that decision.

Why Pakistan Should Join BRICS

1. Economic diversification

Pakistan needs more markets, investors and sources of development finance.

BRICS membership could expand opportunities in:

• infrastructure;
• energy;
• trade;
• investment;
• technology;
• agriculture;
• transportation;
• financial cooperation.

But BRICS membership would not itself fix Pakistan’s economy.

That would be wishful thinking.

Pakistan still has to address its own structural problems:

• low tax collection;
• weak exports;
• energy-sector inefficiencies;
• excessive debt;
• political instability;
• poor productivity.

No international organisation can reform Pakistan in Pakistan’s place.

2. Access to the Global South

If BRICS continues to grow in economic and diplomatic importance, remaining outside it could eventually carry an opportunity cost.

Pakistan should have a voice wherever important decisions concerning the Global South are being discussed.

3. China

Pakistan already has a deep strategic relationship with China.

BRICS would provide another institutional channel for:

• CPEC-related cooperation;
• infrastructure;
• energy;
• technology;
• industrial investment;
• trade.

But Pakistan must not assume that China can simply overcome India’s opposition.

The current situation demonstrates that Beijing’s influence has limits.

4. Russia

Pakistan has gradually improved relations with Moscow.

BRICS could provide additional opportunities for:

• energy;
• agriculture;
• transport;
• investment;
• trade;
• regional connectivity.

5. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf

BRICS could also provide another platform through which Pakistan could engage economically with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

That is important because Pakistan should not view BRICS as a China-Russia project alone.

6. Iran

Pakistan shares a long border with Iran.

Economic cooperation remains important despite the larger geopolitical tensions surrounding Tehran.

BRICS membership could provide another diplomatic channel for engagement on:

• border security;
• trade;
• energy;
• regional connectivity;
• Afghanistan.

Why Pakistan Should Be Cautious

There are also serious disadvantages.

India

The most obvious problem is India’s continuing resistance.

Pakistan cannot force New Delhi to approve its membership.

America

An unnecessarily confrontational BRICS policy could damage relations with Washington.

China

Pakistan must avoid replacing dependence on Western financial institutions with excessive dependence on China.

Expectations

BRICS will not magically solve Pakistan’s economic crisis.

Internal BRICS divisions

Pakistan should also remember that BRICS itself is not a perfectly unified organisation.

Pakistan’s Correct Policy: Join BRICS, But Do Not Join a Camp

This should be the central recommendation of the article.

Pakistan should pursue:

BRICS + SCO + China + USA + Saudi Arabia + UAE + Türkiye + Russia + Iran + European Union

rather than:

BRICS versus America.

That is the difference between strategic diversification and strategic alignment.

Pakistan’s foreign policy should be based on national interests, not ideological camps.

What Pakistan Should Do Now

Even before becoming a full member, Islamabad can deepen engagement with BRICS countries.

Pakistan should:

1. Continue its diplomatic campaign for membership.
2. Engage every BRICS member individually.
3. Expand exports to BRICS markets.
4. Attract BRICS investment.
5. Strengthen economic relations with Brazil and South Africa.
6. Expand trade with Egypt, Ethiopia and Indonesia.
7. Deepen cooperation with China.
8. Improve economic ties with Russia.
9. Strengthen Saudi and UAE investment relationships.
10. Maintain constructive relations with Iran.
11. Expand cooperation with BRICS financial institutions.
12. Improve Pakistan’s own economic fundamentals.

The most important point is this:

Pakistan should not wait for BRICS membership before beginning BRICS-oriented economic diplomacy.

What Pakistan Must Not Do

Pakistan should not:

• turn BRICS into an anti-American campaign;
• use BRICS merely to attack India;
• assume China will solve every diplomatic problem;
• abandon relations with Washington;
• neglect Saudi Arabia and the Gulf;
• become dependent upon another single power;
• confuse multipolarity with prosperity;
• assume membership automatically brings investment.

The purpose of diplomacy is to expand options, not exchange one dependency for another.

Three Possible Futures for BRICS

The future of BRICS could develop along three broad paths.

The third possibility may ultimately prove the most consequential.

BRICS does not have to destroy the existing system to transform it.

It only has to make the system more pluralistic.

The Emerging Multipolar World

The future international system is unlikely to be a simple contest between Washington and Beijing.

Instead, it is likely to contain several overlapping centres of power:

• United States;
• China;
• European Union;
• India;
• Russia;
• Gulf powers;
• BRICS;
• regional middle powers.

In such a world, countries that rely entirely upon one great power will have limited freedom of manoeuvre.

Countries capable of maintaining relationships across competing blocs will have greater strategic flexibility.

That is why Pakistan’s objective should not be to choose between East and West.

It should be to become sufficiently economically and diplomatically relevant that both East and West have an interest in maintaining good relations with Islamabad.

Conclusion: A New World Order—or a More Complicated World?

The New Delhi summit does not mark the birth of a completely new world order.

Nor does it signal the immediate collapse of Western power.

The United States and its allies continue to possess enormous advantages in military capability, finance, technology, alliances and global institutions.

But something important is nevertheless changing.

The era in which a relatively small group of Western powers could shape the international system with little effective competition is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.

BRICS is one manifestation of that transformation.

Its members possess enormous demographic, economic, energy and strategic resources. Yet its internal contradictions prevent it from becoming a coherent alternative to NATO or the Western alliance system.

Perhaps BRICS’ greatest historical significance will therefore not be that it replaces the West, but that it makes the international system less exclusively Western.

The world is moving towards multipolarity—not necessarily because BRICS has defeated the West, but because economic and strategic power is becoming more widely distributed.

For Pakistan, the implications are profound.

Islamabad should continue seeking BRICS membership and accept it if offered. But Pakistan must enter the organisation with a clear understanding of its national interests. BRICS should become another instrument of Pakistan’s economic and diplomatic diversification—not another geopolitical camp.

Pakistan should maintain strong relations with China without becoming dependent upon China; cultivate relations with Russia without becoming part of a Russia-West confrontation; strengthen ties with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye; maintain constructive relations with Iran; and preserve productive relations with the United States and Europe.

The guiding principle should be simple:

Pakistan should not choose between the great powers. It should choose Pakistan.

Strategic autonomy does not mean having no friends.

It means having enough friends, enough economic options and enough diplomatic space that no single power can dictate your choices.

If BRICS opens its door, Pakistan should walk through it—not as China’s proxy, not as Russia’s ally and certainly not as America’s adversary, but as an independent state pursuing its own economic, diplomatic and strategic interests.

The New Delhi summit may therefore prove to be about much more than BRICS.

It may be another milestone in the gradual transition from a predominantly Western-led international system towards a more contested, competitive and genuinely multipolar world.

And for countries such as Pakistan, the question is no longer whether that transformation is happening.

The real question is whether Islamabad will be prepared for it.