(By Faraz Ahmed)
The assassination of Sharif Osman Bin Hadi on 18 December 2025 has become one of the most consequential political deaths in Bangladesh’s recent history. The 32-year-old student leader, who rose to prominence during the 2024 uprising that toppled Sheikh Hasina, was gunned down in Dhaka just days after launching his independent election campaign. His killing has ignited a firestorm of anti-India rage, deepened political polarisation ahead of the 12 February 2026 general election, and opened a rare strategic window for Pakistan in Dhaka.
A Targeted Killing in Broad Daylight
Hadi, spokesperson for the radical Inqilab Mancha (Platform for Revolution), was shot in the head by masked assailants as he left a mosque in Dhaka on 12 December 2025. Critically wounded, he was airlifted to Singapore General Hospital, where he died after six days on life support.
His body was repatriated on 19 December. A post-mortem was conducted at Suhrawardy Medical College Hospital. The janaza (funeral prayer) took place on 20 December at the South Plaza of the National Parliament building, attended by an estimated 50,000–100,000 mourners, including interim leader Muhammad Yunus, army chief General Waker-uz-Zaman, and senior figures from BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and the National Citizen Party (NCP). Yunus declared a national day of mourning.
Hadi was buried beside national poet Kazi Nazrul Islam at Dhaka University’s central mosque—a symbolically powerful resting place that reflected the reverence he commanded among Bangladesh’s youth.
Surge in Anti-India Rage
Hadi’s death triggered immediate violence. Protesters attacked the offices of Prothom Alo and The Daily Star, set fire to Awami League premises, and chanted slogans demanding a boycott of Indian goods and the expulsion of Indian diplomats. Unsubstantiated claims that the assassins had escaped to India further inflamed public anger.
The incident has crystallised long-standing anti-India sentiment, which has been building since Hasina’s flight to India in August 2024 and her subsequent death sentence in absentia. Hadi himself had been one of the most vocal critics of Delhi, circulating maps of a “Greater Bangladesh” that included parts of India’s northeast. His martyrdom has now become a powerful rallying cry for nationalist and Islamist factions.
India’s Alleged Track Record of Targeting Dissidents Abroad
The speed and intensity of anti-India accusations have been amplified by India’s documented history of alleged extraterritorial operations against perceived threats.
In June 2023, Canadian Sikh separatist leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar was assassinated outside a gurdwara in Surrey, British Columbia. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau publicly stated that Canadian intelligence had uncovered “credible allegations” of Indian government involvement. India denied the claims and expelled Canadian diplomats in retaliation.
In November 2023, U.S. authorities foiled an alleged murder-for-hire plot against Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a U.S.-Canadian Sikh activist, in New York City. A U.S. indictment charged an Indian national acting on behalf of an Indian official. India rejected the allegations as “unwarranted” and launched an internal inquiry.
These high-profile cases have reinforced perceptions in Bangladesh that India is willing to eliminate critics beyond its borders. In the absence of concrete evidence, many in Dhaka now view Hadi’s killing through this lens, further fuelling anti-India sentiment.
A Fractured Path to the 2026 Election
With the general election scheduled for 12 February 2026, Hadi’s assassination has created a volatile atmosphere. The interim government has condemned the violence and urged restraint, but the country remains deeply polarised. Media houses and minority communities face renewed threats, and fears persist that fringe elements may attempt to sabotage the polls.
The Awami League remains banned, while BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and student-led parties such as the NCP are gaining momentum. Hadi’s martyrdom is likely to strengthen radical and nationalist groups that frame themselves as defenders of Bangladesh’s sovereignty against perceived Indian interference.
Pakistan’s Strategic Opportunity
The cooling of Bangladesh-India relations has created a rare opening for Pakistan to rebuild and expand its influence in Dhaka.
Since late 2024, bilateral ties have warmed dramatically. Trade has grown by 27% year-on-year, direct flights between Karachi and Dhaka have resumed after a 15-year gap, and military exchanges have intensified. Pakistan’s Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee visited Dhaka in November 2025, and Bangladesh participated in the AMAN-2025 naval exercise hosted by Pakistan.
Concrete avenues now exist for deeper cooperation:
- Joint military training and intelligence sharing
- Enhanced maritime security collaboration in the Bay of Bengal
- Direct sea and air cargo links
- Closer trilateral coordination with China
While no formal mutual defence pact has been proposed, the shared geopolitical interest in countering Indian influence provides fertile ground for such an arrangement in the medium term. Any such move, however, would inevitably provoke strong reactions from New Delhi.
Conclusion
Sharif Osman Hadi’s death is far more than a personal tragedy. It has ignited latent grievances, exposed deep fissures in Bangladesh’s political landscape, and reshaped the regional balance of power. For Bangladesh, the coming months will test whether the country can hold a credible election amid rising nationalism and external pressures. For Pakistan, the moment offers an unprecedented chance to re-enter a country it has long viewed as a strategic prize. And for India, the growing anti-India wave in Dhaka is a stark reminder that influence once taken for granted can be lost in an instant.
Hadi is gone, but the fire he helped ignite is burning brighter than ever.
